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Abstract
What is the effect of the fear of future sovereign default on the economy of
the defaulting country? The typical sovereign default model does not address
this question. In this paper we wish to explore the possibility that changing
expectations about future default themselves can lead to financial stress (as
measured by credit spreads) and recessionary outcomes. We exploit the “news-
shock” framework to consider an environment in which sovereign debt-holders
receive imperfect signals about the portion of debt that a sovereign may default
on in the future. We then investigate how domestic banks can play a role in
transmitting the expectation of default into a realized recession through the
interaction of the domestic banks’ holdings of government debt and their risk-
weighted capital requirements. Our results suggest that, consistent with the
data, even in the absence of actual realized government default, an increase in
pessimism regarding the prospect of future default results in a rise in yields on
government debt and an increase in interest rates on private domestic loans, as
well as a recession in the economy.
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1 Introduction
International capital markets began anticipating a default by Greece (and potentially
by other nations in the Euro zone) on its sovereign bonds months and even years
before the actual event in early 2012. Over time, discussions in the financial press
went from “will a default occur?” to “when the default occurs, how big will the losses
be?” Over this period, Greece faced high and rising interest rates on its sovereign
debt. The yield on ten year Greek sovereign bonds crossed over 10 percent in July 2010
and steadily increased to over 29 percent by February 2012. Meanwhile comparable
rates in Germany (which shares a common currency and monetary policy) fell from
2.6 percent to 1.85 percent over the same period. In addition to the high yield,
there was considerable volatility in the sovereign bond market driven by substantial
uncertainty around the size of the eventual default. Each announcement by political
leaders in Europe or by supra-national institutions like the IMF or the ECB (around,
for example, the probability or size of a bailout fund for Greece) would cause dramatic
swings in the yield on Greek bonds. This period also witnessed an ongoing and
deepening recession in Greece in advance of any actual default by the government
while interest rates on bank loans to private agents rose.
Data from other nations in the Euro-zone display similar patterns: rising yields on
sovereign debt are accompanied by drops in economic activity as well as a rise in credit
spreads (ie., the difference between bank deposit rates and loan rates). Starting with
Greece in mid 2009, interest rates paid by the governments of Ireland and Portugal
in 2010 and eventually by Spain and Italy spiked relative to German bonds. Figure
1 shows the interest rates on 10-year government bonds for Germany, Portugal and
Greece. Figure 2 displays the behaviour of aggregate output while Figure 3 plots
credit spreads for these countries 1
Motivated by these observations from the Euro-zone debt crisis, we propose a
quantitative model that can explain these features of the data. We wish, in particular,
to explore the possibility that merely the expectation of future default by a sovereign
government could be responsible for a recession in the periods prior to the default
event. We note that this is in contrast to the sovereign default literature where
recessions occur either due to the disruptions caused by the default after it occurs or
occur exogenously due to a sequence of bad endowment shocks.2
Rather than revisiting the long literature on why or when government defaults
occur, we wish to take the possibility of defaults as given and explore a number
of potential consequences of the uncertainty around the size of future losses that
are anticipated by bond-holders, often termed “haircuts” in the financial press. We
model the pay-off on government bonds as an exogenous process, and think of the
1Indeed these patterns are not restricted to the euro-zone. Similar phenomena can be seen in
earlier Latin American crisis episodes. The emerging economy business cycle literature emphasizes
the role of fluctuation in sovereign debt yields as a source of recessions (see Garcia-Cicco et al.
(2010), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and the references therein).
2See Mendoza and Yue (2012), Yue (2010), Arellano (2008), etc for models of sovereign defaults.
Some models actually have sequences of declining TFP but we include them in our statement above
since output would fall in these cases even if agents did not change their input decisions. Sosa-Padilla
(2012) is an interesting exception in this literature because the sovereign’s default causes a credit
crunch in banks which leads to a fall in output.
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influences on the pay-off to include any event which may impact bondholders’ real
return including external bail-out funds which may reduce the size of the haircut.
While this notion is most directly linked to an actual default on debt obligations, it
can also more generally be thought to include other possibilities such as the impact
of a change in exchange rate regime. This case is especially relevant in the context
of the EU crisis as bondholders of peripheral EU countries fretted about the impact
on their real returns of these debt-issuing countries exiting the Euro. By treating
the bond payoff as exogenous, we are following a long history of researchers who
incorporate exogenous default, such as Duffie and Singleton (1999), who treat default
as an unpredictable event governed by a hazard-rate process, or Iacoviello (2010) and
Kollmann et al. (2011) who incorporate exogenous default in a structural business
cycle framework closer to ours. While many strides have been made by researches
such as Mendoza and Yue (2012) in incorporating endogenous default into business
cycle models, we think that treating default as an exogenous stochastic process is
reasonable in the context of the EU crisis, given the myriad external actors and
institutions involved in determining the prospect and size of default for a given EU
member country. Furthermore by doing so, we can then explicitly investigate the role
of uncertainty about default by following the approach of the news-shock literature
whereby agents receive imperfect signals about future realizations of some stochastic
process. In particular, we present a model where agents receive imperfect signals that
alter their expectation about future payoffs to holding government bonds.
While it is clear why fear of default would lead to an increase in the interest rate
charged by lenders to (say) the government of Greece, it is not necessarily obvious
3
Figure 2: Constant price GDP, index
-400.0
-300.0
-200.0
-100.0
0.0
100.0
200.0
300.0
2001-04 2002-09 2004-01 2005-05 2006-10 2008-02 2009-07 2010-11 2012-04 2013-08 Germany
Greece
Portugal
why this fear might lead to higher borrowing costs for private sector agents. This
issue is side-stepped in the two literatures that are closely related to our work: the
sovereign default literature as well as the emerging economy business cycle literature.
For example, Mendoza and Yue (2012), perhaps the leading work on the relationship
between business cycles and sovereign defaults, force the link between the two interest
rates by assuming that the defaulting government can divert the repayment of private
loans, so that, in effect, both government and private agents default at the same time.
Since lenders make losses on both public and private debt, interest rates on both are
forced to rise together. See Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for another example. An
alternative approach involves assuming away the distinction between sovereign debt
and private debt as in Uribe and Yue (2006).
Instead of forcing the two sets of interest rates to move together, we propose an
alternative way to link them based on actual institutional arrangements. The link
arises from the presence of domestic banks that borrow funds in order to make loans
to both private firms and to the domestic government in a small open economy model.
A crucial innovation is the introduction of bonds which have long maturity dates. In
the typical DSGE model with government debt, it is standard to have bonds that
mature in one period. In this setting, if agents anticipate defaults on bonds several
periods out, then there is no need for them to react in the bond market until the
period immediately before the actual default is expected to occur since these assets
don’t yet exist as part of loan portfolios. In contrast, in the case of a long bond, when
news arrives today about the size of the “haircut” on future defaults, the price of the
long bonds will plunge in order to compensate buyers for the lower future expected
4
Figure 3: Domestic bank credit spread: bank rate (1-5 year loans) less deposit rate
(overnight rate, new business)
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return, and existing bond-holders will be forced to take a capital loss immediately
since these long bonds are part of existing loan portfolios. We build long maturity
bonds into the model following the approach of Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) by
assuming that government bonds pay an infinite stream of coupons that decay at a
fixed rate. If domestic banks hold a lot of long term sovereign debt (as is the case in
Greece where 60 percent of government debt is held domestically), then their balance
sheets will take a large hit when news arrives of larger future sovereign defaults.
Further, if the loss of bank equity/capital leads to tighter credit conditions such that
loan rates rise relative to the safe rate, firms will borrow and invest less to compensate
for rising borrowing costs, leading to a drop in demand for goods.
Why might a loss of bank capital lead to tighter credit conditions? In practice,
banks face regulatory restrictions on their balance-sheet based on the so-called Basel
Accords. One particular regulation that is relevant here is the capital adequacy
requirement. We reflect this constraint in our model by assuming that banks are
constrained in the amount of risk weighted loans that they can extend relative to
the value of their equity, such that equity must be at least some fraction γ of risk-
weighted loans, where γ might typically be a number like 8% 3 4. As a result, a
3In practice government debt is assigned a zero risk weighting so that banks can include govern-
ment bonds in equity, but they do not count them in as part of risk-weighted loans. This may be
one reason why banks hold so much sovereign debt.
4Iacoviello (2010) shows how one can alternatively think of this constraint as a standard collateral
constraint on bank loans
5
fall in government bond prices lowers equity without lowering risk-weighted loans.
Assuming banks face significant costs in deviating from the regulatory constraint,
banks thus have a strong incentive to reduce dividend payments in order to increase
the proportion of loans that are financed with its own funds as opposed to those of
depositors 5. Banks can thus use their funds to reduce deposits for a given level of
loans, or increase loans for a given level of deposits. Yet since using its own funds
to increase loans raises not just equity but also its fractional loan restriction, the
contribution of loans to loosening the bank’s constraint is only 1 − γ of what is
obtained from reducing deposits, and thus the loan rate rises relative to the deposit
rate to reflect this asymmetry at the margin.
Our bank capital requirement assumptions above are standard in the literature.
For example, banking with capital constraints are studied by Mendoza and Quadrini
(2010) (henceforth MQ) in a two country model. Like us, banks cannot issue equity
in MQ so they must adjust their deposit and loan portfolios when the price of a fixed
capital stock exogenously and unexpectedly falls. While banks in MQ carry a fixed
capital stock whose price varies exogenously, banks in our set-up hold government
bonds whose value is governed by a budget constraint for the government. Moreover
MQ does not deal with news shocks.6
In order to be relevant for nations in the Euro-zone periphery, our small open
economy (SOE) model has a fixed exchange rate and the features mentioned above.
We have calibrated the model to nations in the Euro-zone periphery that have seen
recent spikes in their sovereign debt yields: Greece, Portugal, Ireland and more re-
cently Spain and Italy. Our calibrated model displays large recessions in response to
news about an increase in the losses to bondholders on the debt to be defaulted upon
two years before the event is expected to occur. The model behaves as described
above: on arrival of the news, the price of government debt falls immediately, leading
to a persistent fall in bank capital. The bank responds by cutting dividends and by
reducing borrowing and lending. Loan rates rise, giving rise to a positive correlation
between bank interest rate spreads and sovereign debt yields. Firms cut back on in-
vestment spending and hiring so output falls for an extended period. Borrowing from
abroad also falls over this period. Perhaps an even more interesting case is the one
in which initial fears of a rise in the size of the expected default turns out to be false.
This may help to explain the fall in interest rates seen in some countries as fears of
widespread default have lessened. Our model displays a large recession and a spike
in interest rates on arrival of the news with an eventual recovery of economic activity
and a return of yields to their previous levels. This entire episode occurs purely due
to movements in expectations without any realized change in actual default size.7
5A bank that reduces its dividends enough such that they are negative would in effect be issuing
equity. We effectively limit this possibility by following the standard practice in the literature of
defining the bank’s preferences as concave over its dividends.
6Enders, Kollman and Muller (2011) study the impact of exogenous loan defaults by firms on the
international transmission of business cycles in a model of global banking with capital requirements.
Capital constraints are also important in Iacoviello (2011) where bank capital is reduced by making
one group of households exogenously default on their loans in a closed economy model without news
shocks. See also Gerali et al (2010).
7In order to focus on the issues at hand we have omitted a discussion of anticipated fiscal policy
which is relevant but also better understood. See for example, Leeper and Walker (2011).
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Our model builds on the news shock literature popularized by Beaudry and Portier
(2004, 2006) where agents receive news about future changes in aggregate TFP. News
shocks about TFP in an open economy context are studied in Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2008) and Beaudry et al. (2011). Durdu et al. (2010) study news about future
endowment shocks in a model of sovereign default. Unlike these models, we focus
on news about financial variables in a model where bank capital plays a crucial role
in transmitting news shocks to the real economy. The focus on financial news as a
source of business cycles is shared by Gunn and Johri (2011a,b) and by Gunn and
Johri (2013) in fairly different closed economy contexts.
In the next section we present our model. Section 3 discusses how we parameterize
the linearized model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is composed of four types of agents and a single produced good used
for consumption and investment. The agents in the economy are households, firms,
banks and the government. The economy can borrow and lend abroad at an exoge-
nously given real interest rate. While all agents other than the government behave
competitively, for notational simplicity we will have only one agent of each type in
the economy.
2.1 Household
The representative household has access to a unit time endowment every period which
can be devoted to working at a firm for Nt hours or used to consume leisure. Each
period, preferences are defined over sequences of consumption Ct and leisure, 1−Nt
with expected lifetime utility defined as
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt), (1)
where β is the household’s subjective discount factor and the period utility function
U(Ct, Nt) follows the class of preferences described in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
The household enters into each period with total assets, At, all of which are held
as deposits with the domestic bank where they earn the riskless net interest rate
rate, rdt . It receives the wage rate wt for supplying Nt hours to the goods-producing
firm, and receives any profits earned by the firm as the firm’s owner as a lump sum
payment denoted as Πt. At the end of the period, the household uses this income for
consumption, Ct, to pay lump-sum taxes to the government, Tt and the remainder,
At+1, is deposited with the bank.
The household’s period t budget constraint is given by
Ct + At+1 = (1 + r
d
t )At + wtNt + Πt − Tt, (2)
where the interest rate rdt on current deposits is known at the time the deposit is
made.
7
The household’s problem is to choose sequences Ct, Nt, and At+1 to maximize
(19) subject to (2), yielding the respective first-order conditions
uC(Ct, Nt) = λ
h
t (3)
−uN(Ct, Nt) = λhtwt (4)
λht = β(1 + r
d
t+1)Et
{
λht+1
}
, (5)
where λht refers to the Lagrange multiplier on (2). Since the household problem is
standard, we do not discuss it further except to note for future use that (5) implies
1
1+rdt+1
is equal to the household’s risk-free rate as well as the firm’s stochastic discount
factor since it is owned by the household.
2.2 Firm
Once again we assume that there is a single competitive goods-producing firm that
produces output Yt using a constant returns to scale technology given by
Yt = ZtN
α
t (utKt)
1−α, (6)
where Nt is total hours-hired by the firm, Kt is the period t stock of physical capital
held by the firm, and ut is the utilization rate of that capital. Note that our nota-
tion anticipates market clearing so that we do not distinguish between quantities on
the two sides of the market unless necessary. The firm accumulates capital via the
following accumulation equation
Kt+1 = [1− δ(ut)]Kt + It, (7)
where the function δ(·) imposes a cost on the firm for increasing capacity utilization
in the form of increased depreciation of capital, such that δ(·) satisfies the conditions
δ′(·) > 0, δ′′(·) ≥ 0.
To motivate a role for borrowing, we simply follow the practice common in the
emerging economy business cycle literature and assume that the firm must borrow
some fraction τ of its capital stock in advance of production 8, such that it faces the
constraint
Lt+1 ≥ τKt+1. (8)
One interpretation of this constraint is that the amount τKt+1 represents the firm’s
ongoing working capital requirements, which by virtue of pre-determination, must be
financed in advance of production the following period. Thus in period t the firm
must borrow an amount Lt+1 from the bank at the non-contingent rate r
L
t+1, paying
back both the principal and interest the following period.
Based on the structure above, the firm’s profit in period t is given by
Πt = Yt − (1 + rLt )Lt − wtNt − It + Lt+1. (9)
8We could motivate an alternative motive for firm-borrowing using one of the many alternative
options in the literature without changing the fundamental mechanism in our model.
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The firm chooses labour (Nt), capital (Kt+1), and loans (Lt+1) to maximize current
and expected future profits,
∞∑
s=0
βt+s
λht+s
λht
Πt+s, (10)
subject to the borrowing constraint and the capital accumulation equation, taking
all prices and interest rates as given. Note that the term βt+s
λht+s
λht
is the household-
owner’s stochastic discount factor. The firm’s problem yields the following first-order
conditions
wt = α
Yt
Nt
(11)
δ′(ut)Kt = (1− α)Yt
ut
(12)
1 + qlft = β(1 + r
L
t+1)Et
λht+1
λht
=
(1 + rLt+1)
(1 + rdt+1)
, (13)
1 + τqlft = βEt
λht+1
λht
{
(1− α) Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1− δ)
}
, (14)
where qlft refers to the lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint. Since the
firm is owned by the household, it evaluates future profits at the same rate as the
household evaluates an extra unit of consumption in the future.
The second equality in (13) uses this relationship as was discussed at the end of
the previous sub-section. Equation (13) makes clear why the cost of borrowing one
unit of goods is higher than unity for the firm : it must pay more to the bank for
this good than is valued by the actual owners of the firm for whom it is investing
in physical capital. It also makes clear why a rise in the credit spread will raise the
borrowing costs for the firm and make them more reluctant to invest, a point to which
we will return when discussing the results of the model. While the interpretation of
the remaining first order conditions is obvious, we note that combining (13) and (14)
to eliminate qlft makes clear that the cost of an additional unit of capital is not merely
the current lost profits (which are less than a unit of profit since the firm can borrow
the rest) but also the future loan payments which depend on the going interest rate
when the loan is contracted.
Regarding the firm’s inequality borrowing constraint, because the household owns
the firm, and thus the firm discounts its dividends with the household’s stochastic
discount factor, the bank could potentially obtain funds at opportunity cost rd directly
from the household by lowering its profits. Since in the steady state we consider
rL > rd, given some need for funds, the firm wouldn’t borrow from the bank at rL
when it can alternatively obtain funds from the household at a lower rate. Outside
of steady, we consider episodes where rL rises above rd when expectations of default
rise, and thus this argument becomes more pronounced. Thus we only consider an
equilibrium where this constraint holds with equality, such that
Lt+1 = τKt+1. (15)
9
2.3 Government
The government finances its spending Gt through lump-sum taxation Tt and new-debt
issues in the form of long-duration bonds. To model the long-bonds in a tractable
way, we follow the approach of Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) in assuming that each
period the government issues bonds that provide an infinite stream of future coupons
that decline at a constant rate δg. The government’s accumulated sum of past bond
contracts then summarizes its accumulated debt obligations in a single state variable.
As discussed by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), this particular coupon structure is
a tractable way of approximating the debt-portfolio dynamics of a government that
issues a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds of different maturities, where the proportion
of bonds of a given maturity declines geometrically with maturity. As such, the rate
of decrease of the coupon payment, δg, is associated with the average duration of the
portfolio and thus can be tied down to the observed duration in the data.
The details of the government’s financing are as follows. Each period, the govern-
ment finances its spending Gt and coupon payments on accumulated debt B
g
t through
lump-sum taxation Tt and new bond issues I
g
t , where each bond is a promise to pay
(1−δ)s−1 units of consumption each future period t+s, where s ≥ 1. Additionally, we
allow the government to default on some fraction θt of its existing obligations. Since
its existing obligations are long-duration bonds, they entail both current and future
coupon payments, and thus a current default in outstanding debt obligations at time
t impacts both current and future coupon payments for all bonds contracted in the
past up to and including period t−1. A current default θt does not, however, impact
coupons payments of new or future issuances. As discussed in the introduction, we
represent this fractional default θt parameter as an exogenous process.
In any period t, the government’s accumulated debt obligations are the sum of its
entire history of past issuances and defaults,
Bgt+1 = I
g
t +
t∑
j=1
θt−j(1− δg)jIgt−j = θt−1(1− δg)Bt−1 + Igt . (16)
We can then summarize the government’s behaviour with its period t budget
constraint,
Gt + θtB
g
t = Tt + q
g
t I
g
t , (17)
where qgt is the price of the long-duration bond, and its evolution of debt obligations,
Bgt+1 = θt(1− δg)Bgt + Igt . (18)
Note that the default parameter θ appears both in the budget constraint (17) as
well as the debt obligation accumulation equation (18). This reflects the assumption
that a default in period t affects both the current coupon payments on historical
contracts made prior to period t (budget constraint) as well as the future coupon
payments for these same historical contracts (debt accumulation). Note however that
a default in period t does not affect the coupon payments associated with current and
future issuances, It+s for s ≥ 0.
In the current version of the model, we take both government tax policy Tt and
the value of new debt issues qgt I
g
t as exogenous, such that each period, government
10
spendingGt adjusts to satisfy the government budget constraint. This assumption has
the advantage of isolating the banking-channel transmission of changes in the yield
on government debt by removing any income effects on the household that would
otherwise be associated with endogenously fluctuating taxes Tt which are relatively
well understood9.
2.4 Bank
The representative bank has preferences defined over sequences of consumption Dt
with expected lifetime utility defined as
U b = E0
∞∑
t=0
βbtv(Dt), (19)
where βb < β is the bank’s subjective discount factor.10 Here the period utility has
the form
v(Dt) =
1
1− σB {D
1−σB
t − 1}. (20)
Each period, the bank makes 1-period loans Lt+1 to the firm at risk-free rate r
L
t ,
in addition to purchases of new long-duration bonds, Ibt , from the government. The
bank’s accumulated stock of government bonds, Bbt , follows an analogous process to
that of the government,
Bbt+1 = θt(1− δg)Bbt + Ibt , (21)
where government defaults θt reduce the bank’s outstanding holdings of government
debt.
The bank finances these loans with 1-period deposits from the household at risk-
free rate, rdt , from 1-period international borrowing, B
w
t+1 at risk-free rate r
w
t , as well
as its own end-of-period equity Et+1.
11 The bank’s end-of-period equity is defined as
Et+1 = Lt+1 + q
g
t+1B
b
t+1 − At+1 −Bwt+1. (22)
We follow Kollmann et al. (2011) in assuming that the bank faces a capital re-
quirement in the form of a penalty φt for deviating from some desired bank capital
ratio, Et+1
Lt+1
= γ. Letting xt = Et+1 − γLt+1, we assume that φt is defined as a convex
adjustment cost according to
φt = φ(x), φ
′′ > 0, φ(0) = 0. (23)
As is standard in small open economy models, the world interest rate is taken
as given. Overall the small open economy can borrow or lend as much as it wishes
9In other versions of the model we obtain results for this alternate case where Gt is exogenous
and Tt fluctuates to satisfies the government budget constraint. In contrast to the current model,
increases in the government’s debt obligations drive up its taxes Tt, impacting the household directly
with a negative income effect. These results are available from the authors upon request
10It is quite common to model banks as agents with concave preferences (see Guerrieri et al.
(2012), Kollmann (2012) and references within).
11Foreign borrowing does not play a crucial role in our story and can be eliminated from the model
without adversely affecting model results which are available from the authors upon request.
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without affecting the rate. This creates the well-known unit root in foreign bonds,
making the quantity of BW undetermined. To remove this unit-root, we follow the
standard solution of including quadratic costs of adjustment ψw
2
(Bwt − Bw)2 on Bw
around a stationary steady-state level of foreign borrowing.
Based on the above discussion, the bank’s budget constraint is
Dt + q
g
t I
b
t + Lt+1 +
ψw
2
(BWt −BW )2 =
At+1 +B
W
t+1 + θtB
b
t + (1 + r
L
t )Lt − (1 + rdt )At − (1 + rWt )BWt − φt, (24)
where Bbt evolves according to (21). As in the case of the government, note that the
presence of θ in both the bank’s budget constraint and as well as the evolution of
its government debt holdings (21) means that a period t government default impacts
both current coupon and future coupon payments of existing contracted debt.
The bank operatives competitively, taking prices as given to maximize (19) subject
to (24), yielding the first-order conditions
λBt = D
−σB
t (25)
λBt [1 + φ
′(xt)] = βB(1 + rdt+1)Etλ
B
t+1 (26)
λBt [1 + (1− γ)φ′(xt)] = βB(1 + rLt+1)EtλBt+1 (27)
λBt q
g
t [1 + φ
′(xt)] = βBEtλBt+1θt+1[1 + q
g
t+1(1− δb)], (28)
λBt [1 + φ
′(xt)] = βBEtλBt+1(1 + r
W
t+1 + ψw(B
W
t+1 −BW )), (29)
where λBt is the Lagrange multiplier on (24).
Note from (26) and (27) that the loan rate and deposit rate are related by the
expression
1 + rLt+1
1 + rdt+1
=
1 + (1− γ)φ′(xt)
1 + φ′(xt)
, (30)
and that one impact of the capital sufficiency requirement, γ, is to induce a spread
between the loan rate and the deposit rate. Clearly setting γ = 0 implies the two rates
are the same. In the absence of this requirement restricting loans to be a multiple
of end-of-period equity, banks would act as a frictionless conduit of funds from the
households to firms in the model and variation in the price of government debt, while
affecting bank capital, would have little impact on the borrowing costs of firms and
through them, on the real economy.
Comparing (26) and (29) reveals that the bank must equate the value of expected
borrowing costs associated with deposits from households and borrowing abroad (the
right hand sides of the two equations). Since the world interest rate is a constant
parameter, any changes to the risk free rate of households (also rdt+1) must be met by
changes in foreign borrowing until the expected costs are equalized.
Note also that (30) reflects the asymmetric impact of loans and deposits on the
firm’s capital requirement. If the bank wants to increase its capital ratio, it can either
maintain its existing level of loans and then forgo consumption to reduce its deposits,
or alternatively, maintain its existing level of deposits and forego consumption to
increase loans. The impact on the capital ratio of a marginal reduction in deposits is
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larger than that of an increase in loans since the former only affects the numerator
while the latter affects both numerator and denominator in the same direction. In
a similar vein, a shock to government bond prices only affects the numerator of the
capital ratio while a change in loans affects both. In the face of a shock to the value of
its bond holdings, the bank has a number of margins on which to adjust. It can lower
consumption to try to fully absorb the loss of equity but this is painful due to the
curvature in the bank’s preferences. It can leave loans at previous levels by allowing
x to fall but this imposes adjustment costs captured by φ on the bank. It can also
try to raise equity by borrowing less both from the household and abroad, but this
leaves less funds for making loans which in turn further reduces equity. As a result,
the bank will adjust on all of these margins so as to satisfy the efficiency conditions
listed above. The bank will borrow less and lend less as well as reduce consumption
while tolerating a small change in x. By (30) the change in x leads to a rise in rL
over rd which raises the cost of borrowing for the firm leading it to lower borrowing
and invest less in physical capital.
2.5 Stochastic process θt
As discussed earlier θ refers to the fraction of the government’s debt obligations that
it intends to honour. In the parlance of the financial press, 1− θ refers to the size of
the ”haircut” that existing bond-holders will get when a default occurs. We model the
size of the default as an exogenous process which evolves according to the stationary
AR(1) process
ln θt = ρ ln θt−1 + µt, (31)
where ρ < 1 and µt is an exogenous period t innovation which we will define further
below. Note from (28) that negative shocks to θ will cause bond-holders to face a
capital loss as the price of government bonds falls to compensate buyers for the lower
expected return on their investment. While we will discuss the impact of shocks
that are unexpected in this paper we are mainly interested in exploring the role of
unanticipated shocks or ”news shocks” about the value of θ at future dates which
may or may not turn out to be realized. Later, when we parameterize the model,
we will assume that the persistence of the shock process is zero so that there are no
subsequent haircuts to bond holders that are induced by the current shock.
2.5.1 News shocks
Our representation of news shocks is standard and follows Christiano et al. (2008).
We provide for news about θt by defining the innovation µt in equation (31) as
µt = 
p
t−p + εt, (32)
where pt−p is a news shock that agents receive in period t−p about the innovation
µt, and εt is an unanticipated contemporaneous shock to µt. The news shock 
p
t
has properties Ept = 0 and standard deviation σp , and the contemporaneous shock
εt has properties Eεt = 0 and standard deviation σεx . The shocks 
p
t and εA,t are
uncorrelated over time and with each other.
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2.6 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this economy is defined by contingent sequences of Ct, Nt, It, Dt, I
g
t ,
At+1, Lt+1, Kt+1, B
g
t+1, B
w
t+1, wt, r
d
t , r
l
t that satisfy the following conditions: (i) the
allocations solve the household’s, firm’s and bank’s problems, taking prices as given,
and, (ii) all markets clear.
3 Parameterization
In this section we present an illustrative calibration based on available data from the
Euro-zone periphery that we will use in the next section for our simulation analysis.
We assign values to parameters using typical values established in the literature, or
where there is a lack of precedent, we choose the parameters to match relevant steady
state quantities in the model economy with analogous quantities in the data. Finally,
we solve the model by using standard methods to linearize the non-linear system
about the unique steady state.
We use preferences of the form used by King and Rebelo (2000) where the stand-in
representative agent has the preference specification
u(Ct, Nt) =
1
1− σ
{
C1−σt υ
∗(Nt)1−σ − 1
}
, (33)
where υ∗(Nt) =
[(
Nt
H
)
υ
1−σ
σ
1 +
(
1− Nt
H
)
υ
1−σ
σ
2
] σ
1−σ
, where H is the fixed shift length,
and υ1 and υ2 are constants representing the leisure component of utility of the un-
derlying employed group (who work H hours) and unemployed group (who work zero
hours) respectively. For σ > 1 these preferences are not separable in consumption
and leisure, and for σ = 1 they reduce down to standard separable indivisible labour
preferences with log-consumption and linear leisure. We set the fraction of the popu-
lation working on average, fw to 0.6, and the average fraction of the time endowment
allocated to market work Nss to 0.3. In our impulse-response analysis, we set σ = 2,
which is within the range of studies reported by King and Rebelo (2000) and equal
to the value used in Gunn and Johri (2011a) and Gunn and Johri (2012).
3.0.1 Firm’s Parameters
On the production side, we set labour’s share in production, α = .67 and impose
constant returns on the production technology. The depreciation of physical capital,
δ is set to the typical value of 0.025. We set the elasticity of capacity utilization,
u = .15, the value used in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Gunn and Johri (2011a)
and also explore a higher value of 0.56. While we have allowed the possibility for total
factor productivity shocks to occur in the model, we do not explore them here so that
Z = 1 in every period. The firm’s problem involves the parameter τ which governs
the fraction of the capital stock next period that must be acquired though loans. We
target τ = .39 which is chosen so that the loan to annual gdp ratio matches the mean
value for the Euro Area as reported by Kollmann et al. (2011) of 0.9. The implied
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steady state value for the capital output ratio implied by our parameter choices is 9.3
which is in the usual range of quarterly values used in the business cycle literature.
3.0.2 Government Parameters
Turning to the government, we follow standard practice and set the ratio of govern-
ment spending to output equal to 0.2 while the fraction of taxes collected by the
government in steady state is equal to .285. These values deliver bank holdings of
government debt to total bank assets equal to 0.07 which is the value reported for
Spain in IMF (2012) and we show sensitivity by picking a higher value so that bank
holdings of government debt divided by bank’s assets = 0.12 as is found in Greece. In
steady state we assume that the government meets its entire debt obligations so that
θ = 1. We target the depreciation rate on government bonds, δb to match the average
duration of bonds seen in the euro-zone periphery. According to Contessi (2012),
Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece had a weighted maturity as of December 31, 2011
of between 5-10 years so we picked 7.5 years for the model to target in steady state.
Following Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) the duration in quarters can be calculated
from
D = (1 + rg)/(δb + r
g)
where D refers to the duation and rg to the implied constant yield on government
debt from the formula:
rg = (1/qg)− δb.
This gives us a value of δb = 0.023.
3.0.3 Bank Parameters
The remaining parameters apply to the bank. Data on net external debt as a per-
centage of gdp varies widely for the Euro-zone periphery nations for the last ten
years from about 30 percent to about 90 percent. We picked a conservative value
of 50 percent for the steady state external debt to gdp ratio and show sensitivity to
increasing this parameter. We vary the adjustment cost associated with changing
external borrowing,ψw and show it’s impact on the model in the next section. Our
baseline value is 0.1. It plays no role in steady state but influences how strongly ex-
ternal borrowing reacts to changes in sovereign yields. We set the capital sufficiency
requirement to 8 percent based on the so called Basel II documents and explore the
impact of changing this number. Kollmann et al. (2011) use a value of 5 percent
while Gerali et al. (2010) and Guerrieri et al. (2012) use values of 9 and 10 percent
respectively. Turning to φ′′, we set the baseline value to .25 as in Kollmann et al.
(2011) while Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) work with a value of .1. We explore the
impact of varying this parameter which governs the adjustment cost of deviating from
the steady state capital to loan ratio.
The parameters of the preferences of the bank are βb = 0.98 and σb = 1. The
spread between the risk free rate paid on deposits and the rate charged on loans by
banks are mainly governed by βb and γ. Related studies work with lower discount
factors for the less patient agent (in our case the bank). Guerrieri et al. (2012) use .96
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while Gerali et al. (2010) use .975. This allows the steady state spread (the loan rate)
to be a bit higher but it does not have a major impact on the quantitative properties
of the model so we do not show sensitivity to varying this parameter.
4 Results
In this section we explore the impulse responses of the calibrated model to shocks to
the default parameter θt. To help illustrate the mechanics of the model, we first begin
with a contemporaneous shock to θ before moving on to look at anticipated default
using news shocks about θ.
4.1 Contemporaneous shock to θt
Figures 4 and 5 show the response of the model economy to a 25% fall in θt in period 1,
representing an unanticipated 25% drop in the return recieved by government bond-
holders in period 1. The shock process has zero persistence, so as indicated in the last
panel of Figure 4, θt returns to its steady value in period 2. As can be seen from the
figure, in response to this one-time shock, consumption, investment, hours-worked
and output all drop immediately, and then gradually rise towards steady-state well
into the future. Moreover, the loan rate rises and the deposit rate falls, indicating an
immediately rise in the credit spread. Interestingly, the price of government bonds qg
rises immediately, implying a drop in the implied interest rate on government bonds.
The initial impact effect of the shock works through the bank’s budget constraint
as an unanticipated drop in the the bank’s period t return on its government bond
portfolio. Faced with this unanticipated drop in period t income, the bank reduces
its consumption in the present, but by an amount less than the drop in income. This
consumption-smoothing motive entices it to spread the impact through time, willingly
reducing its end-of-period equity in order to pull future consumption into the present.
To reduce its end-of-period equity the bank can either increase deposits or decrease
loans in the present, yet since a given rise in loans reduces its excess capital by a factor
of 1−γ less than a rise in deposits, to remain indifferent at the margin, in equilibrium
the loan rate rl must rise relative to the deposit rate rd. As a result, the credit spread
rlt+1 − rdt+1 rises immediately.
Taking (13) from the firm’s problem and combining with (5) we obtain
1 + qlft =
(1 + rLt+1)
(1 + rdt+1)
, (34)
which makes clear that the shadow price of borrowing to invest rises with the credit
spread. Since the firm’s capital Euler equation indicates that the firm’s optimal
investment schedule is a function of the credit spread (via qlft ) as well as the level
of the risk-free rate, in the face of rising spreads, firms reduce their demand for new
investment at the given risk-free rate, which consequently reduces their demand for
bank loans. This overall reduction in the demand for credit forces the bank to reduce
its overall liabilities, implying that in equilibrium the deposit rate rdt falls such that
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Figure 4: Contemporaneous fall in θ - plot 1
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the household is willing to reduce its supply of deposits, signifying an overall reduction
in the household’s risk-free rate.
This drop in the risk-free rate, rd, causes the household to reduce its labour supply,
which manifests itself as a rise in the real wage (not shown in figure) and a drop in
hours-worked. Over time this effect is combined with a drop in labour demand due
to the falling capital stock.
While the model response to the contemporaneous shock exhibits some patterns
which are consistent with the ongoing Euro-area sovereign debt crisis episode, a few
aspects are inconsistent. The government’s debt falls when the shock hits since the
default allows it to fund its obligations with less borrowing. Moreover, the implied
interest rate on government debt 1/qg falls. The rise in government borrowing and
sudden rise in the interest rate on government debt are important features of the
sovereign debt crisis which the contemporaneous shock model fails to deliver. Perhaps
more fundamentally, while we have eventually observed a realized sovereign default,
it did not occur until March 2012, nearly two years after many economies began
exhibiting the features of the crisis discussed in the introduction. To address these
issues we now turn to the illustrating the response of the model to anticipated rather
than unanticipated default.
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Figure 5: Contemporaneous fall in θ - plot 2
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4.2 Anticipated increase in government default
We now consider the case of anticipated default where agents receive news in advance
about a future default. To illustrate the importance of long-bonds in the model, we
first consider the case where the government only issues 1-period bonds, corroborating
the result of Kollmann et al. (2011) that anticipated default has no real impact in
a 1-period bond model economy. We then subsequently consider the full case where
the government issues the infinite coupon long-bond.
4.2.1 Anticipated increase in government default with 1-period bonds
Figures 6 and 7 show the response to an anticipated default in the 1-period bond
model economy which receives a news shock in period 1 that θ will fall by 25% in
period 8, and then in period 8 θ does actually falls by 25% 12. Note that consumption,
investment, hours-worked and output fail to move away from steady state in response
to either the news shock in period 1 or the realization of of the shock in period 8. In
period 7 before the realization, the price of government bonds, qg, falls for a single
period (ie the interest rate on government bonds rises), and as well, the government
increases new debt issues Ig, temporarily increasing its stock of outstanding debt B
g.
Unlike in the case of the contemporaneous shock, when the expected default occurs
12As we discussed earlier, it is straightforward to show that setting δb = 1 reduces the infinite-
coupon bond to a standard 1-period bond.
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Figure 6: News about fall in θ - shock realized: 1-period bond - plot 1
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7 periods in the future, the bank experiences no income loss in the current period.
More importantly, the bank experiences no income loss even in the default period 8.
Since the 1-period bonds are priced each period based on the expected return the
following period, when agents receive news in period 1 about the expected fall in θt
in period 8, they have full knowledge of the drop in expected return, such that when
period 7 arrives, the value of a 1-period bond falls in order to reflect the expected loss
next period. As a consequence, the change in the bond price has no impact on the
bank’s equity since the 1-period bonds only sit on the bank’s balance sheet for a single
period, and the bank trades the bonds at the same time that they are priced. Thus
with no impact to the bank, the anticipated default has no impact on the household
or the firm. It does, however, impact the government’s budget constraint. In period
7 when qg falls, the government must effectively issue more debt than normal to cover
the higher interest rates on bonds that agents believe it will default on. While this
temporarily increases the government’s outstanding debt, when period 8 arrives, the
government defaults on a fraction θt of its debt, thus reducing its outstanding stock
back to the steady state level. Thus while the anticipated default in this 1-period
bond economy does have an effect on the variables associated with the government,
there is no impact on the remainder of the real economy.
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Figure 7: News about fall in θ - shock realized: 1 period bond - plot 2
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4.2.2 Anticipated increase in government default with long-bonds
Figures 8 and 9 show the response of the long-bond model economy to an anticipated
default whereby agents receive a news shock in period 1 that θ will fall by 25% in
period 8, and then in period 8 θ falls by 25%. As can be seen from the figure, in
response to the news shock, consumption, investment, hours-worked and output all
drop immediately, and persistently stay below steady state for all periods shown in
the figure. As in the case of the contemporaneous shock, the loan rate rises and the
deposit rate falls, indicating an immediately rise in the credit spread. In contrast to
that case, now the price of government bonds, qg, falls immediately, implying a rise in
the yield on government bonds which is consistent with observations from the Euro-
zone. Bank equity and bank consumption also drop immediately, and deposits and
loans begin a gradual fall and remain persistently below steady state for all periods
shown in the figure.
Unlike in the case of the one-period bond, the news shock now has a direct impact
on the price of the long-bond in period 1. Note that in the bank’s government bond
first-order condition (28), the price of the bond next period qgt+1 is on the right hand
side of the equation, reflecting the positive market value of the bond next period
since the bond will continue to pay coupons into the future. Iterating this equation
into the future 8 periods then reveals that the price today depends on the expected
value of θ for all periods leading up to and including period 8. Thus news that θt will
decrease in period 8 immediately reduces the price of the long bond in period 1 as
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Figure 8: News about fall in θ - shock realized: - plot 1
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compensation to the potential investor for this expected loss 13.
Since the bank’s equity depends on the value of its stock of government debt
on its balance sheet, qgtBg
g
t+1, the drop in q
g
t+1 causes an immediately drop in the
bank’s equity, thereby reducing its excess capital, forcing the bank to incur costs for
deviating from the legislated (or desired) capital ratio. The bank, as a result, tries to
increase its excess capital by reducing consumption, reducing deposits or increasing
loans, however, since loans contribute to excess capital by a factor of 1− γ less than
deposits, deposits respond by more, pulling the amount of loans down with it and the
loan rate rlt+1 rises relative to r
d
t+1, increasing the credit spread immediately.
Then, as in the case of the contemporaneous shock, the rise in the credit spread
causes a drop in investment and therefore a fall in demand for loans by firms, and a
consequent fall in the deposit rate, rat+1, as banks work to discourage deposits hence
lowering their liabilities. The drop in the household’s risk-free rate then reduces
labour supply, which combined with the drop in labour demand in future periods due
to the declining capital stock, produces a persistent drop in hours-worked and output.
Note, in addition, that unlike the contemporaneous case, government debt now
rises in response to the shock as the increase in interest rate on government bonds
forces the government to borrow more to finance its existing obligations.
13Note that for δg = 1, which corresponds to the 1-period bond case, qgt+1 drops out of the right
hand side of equation (28), severing any relation of the current price to values of θ more than one
period in the future, illustrating in a compact way why news has no effect in the 1-period bond
version of the model.
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Figure 9: News about fall in θ - shock realized: - plot 2
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4.2.3 Unrealized fears
While we have witnessed an actual default by the government of Greece, many other
nations caught up in sovereign default fears have yet to default, and may never do so.
The news shock methodology is interesting in this situation because it allows us to
analyze the macroeconomic implications of news that fails to materialize. While too
stark to be realistic, we find the following exercise to be quite helpful in interpreting
current events in Europe. In period 1 agents recieve news that θ will fall in period 8
by 25 percent. In period 8, an exactly off-setting contemporaneous shock to θ renders
the news false. As a result, all the actions taken by agents in fear of a sovereign default
need to be reversed and the economy slowly recovers from the recession. Figures 10
and 11 show the response of the long-bond model economy for the unrealized news-
shock case. Much of what was discussed in the previous section is true here as well.
Since agents receive the same news in period 1 as in the realized shock case, their
responses are exactly the same up until period 7 : the immediate rise in the yield
on government debt and consequent loss of bank capital causes the credit spread
to rise as well. This leads to less credit in the banking system, a fall in loans and
investment as well as in output, consumption and hours worked. Once again the
fear of a future default unleashes strong movement in prices that trigger a recession.
In period 8 those fears prove to be unfounded and there is an immediate spike in
government bond prices which then slowly recover to steady state values. The spike
in bond prices causes an immediate increase in bank capital which allows the bank
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Figure 10: News about fall in θ - shock unrealized: - plot 1
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to increase consumption. Lending rates fall back while deposit rates rise quickly and
slowly recover to their steady state levels and bank deposits and total quantity of
loans slowly recover. The fall in the credit spread encourages the firm to borrow and
invest in physical capital and to hire more labor so that output and consumption also
rise. We find this exercise particularly interesting because it helps shed light on the
recessions experienced by many Euro-zone nations in the absence of any sovereign
defaults based purely on changes in expectations.
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Figure 11: News about fall in θ - shock unrealized: - plot 2
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Figure 12: News about fall in θ - shock realized: γ sensitivity
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Notes: The figure above shows impulse responses to a fulfilled news-shock for different
values of γ. Each line corresponds to a different value of γ, ranging from 0.0001 (thinner)
to 0.3 (thicker).
5 Sensitivity to key parameters
In this section we explore the sensitivity of our model results to variations in key
parameters. As can be seen from Figures 12 - 15, while the results do change with the
parameters, the story told in the previous section remains intact. Not surprisingly,
both γ, the capital requirements ratio, and φ2, the adjustment cost parameter on
excess capital, are key parameters for transmitting the news shock about government
default into real activity, and in general the depth of the recession falls as these two
parameters are reduced. As γ approaches zero, given some change in equity, altering
either loans or deposits offers equal marginal impact for the bank on restoring its
capital ratio, and thus there is no rise in the credit spread, rl − rd and consequently
no impact on demand for new capital. As φ2 approaches zero, the bank faces no
penalty for deviating from the capital requirement, and thus again there is no rise in
the credit spread and no impact on the demand for new capital.
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Figure 13: News about fall in θ - shock realized: φ2 sensitivity
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Notes: The figure above shows impulse responses to a fulfilled news-shock for different
values of φ2. Each line corresponds to a different value of φ2, ranging from 0.05 (thinner)
to 2.5 (thicker).
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Figure 14: News about fall in θ - shock realized: τ sensitivity
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Notes: The figure above shows impulse responses to a fulfilled news-shock for different
values of τ . Each line corresponds to a different value of τ , ranging from 0.05 (thinner) to
0.5 (thicker).
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Figure 15: News about fall in θ - shock realized: ψw sensitivity
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Notes: The figure above shows impulse responses to a fulfilled news-shock for different
values of ψw. Each line corresponds to a different value of ψw, ranging from 0.01 (thinner)
to 1 (thicker).
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6 Conclusion
Can the mere fear of future sovereign default in itself lead to a recession ? We build
a model which answers the question in the affirmative. Our small open economy
model delivers a fall in output, consumption, investment and hours as well as in the
amount of credit flowing through the banking system in conjunction with a rise in the
spread between loan and deposit rates purely in anticipation of a future default by
the government on its debt. These features are consistent with recent observations
from the Euro-zone periphery nations such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and
Ireland. Our paper contributes to several recent literatures including studies that
emphasise the role of banking capital in economic fluctuations as well as the news
shock literature. While most studies of news shocks focus on news about total factor
productivity or fiscal policy, we extend these ideas to the financial sphere and study
the impact of news about the expected return on sovereign bonds due to a default.
Relative to the business cycle literature with a banking system, the presence of long
maturity bonds is unusual and essential to the story. In addition to the transmission
of financial shocks to the real sector, a contribution of the model is the link between
sovereign yields and credit spreads created by the interaction of long bonds on the
balance sheet of banks with a capital sufficiency requirement.
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